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War Plan Amber was one of the color-coded war plans drafted during by the United States.
Development of War Plan Amber
War Plan Yellow
Prior to the creation of War Plan Amber, the only color-coded plan pertaining to China was War Plan Yellow. This plan dealt primarily with unrest in China or military action against American nationals by the Chinese government itself absent of Japanese, British, or French involvement[1]. It was broadly limited in scope, somewhat underdeveloped conceptually, and focused mainly on coastal areas.
War Plan Yellow was intended to enforce parts of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 by keeping sea lines of communication to Peking (Beijing) open and ensuring the safety of American citizens endangered by armed groups, including forces in opposition to the central Chinese government or the Chinese government itself.[2] There were two variations of the plan. Variation A[3] was a limited operation conducted primarily by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, with only limited U.S. Army reinforcement from the Philippines and Hawaii. It aimed at securing seaports for a short period of time to evacuate American citizens, after which it would withdraw. Variation B[4] on the other hand called for a more involved restoration of order. It would involve the deployment of forces to Peking, Chinwangtao, Shanghai, and Taku to take control of the country's centers of commerce and most developed transportation infrastructure. Early drafts of Variation B called for 5 infantry divisions. Although this was formally reduced to 2 divisions in 1929, it was expected to take more troops. Just guarding the Peiping-Tientsin-Taku-Chiwangtao railway would require 3 divisions, plus a division for seaports.
One key challenge envisioned as part of Yellow Variation B was lacking transportation infrastructure in China—particularly few roads that could support motor vehicles. If enacted, American forces would likely be limited to beasts of burden, walking, and riverine transport provided by the U.S. Navy for movement across the country. The potential requirement of patrolling rivers, destroying coastal fortifications, protecting captured seaports, evacuating American citizens, and transporting ground forces would have likely outpaced the U.S. Navy's resources at the time, though. Organized resistance from the Chinese military, who while fractured might unite in opposition to American opposition, was also a significant threat that could overwhelm a small American force or force the commitment of more divisions. The plan did not feature a comprehensive mobilization plan, however, and the U.S. military's ability to get all those troops to China was questionable. Further, Variation B lacked a convincing exit strategy that determined the point when American forces could withdraw, potentially setting the U.S. up for an unwinnable foreign war against the Chinese.
War Plan Orange
Synthesis with War Plan Orange
In December 1937, following the Japanese sinking of the USS Panay on the Yangtze River and the Nanjing massacre, the U.S. War Department began independently drafting War Plan Amber as a contingency for war against Japan in China. After Japan declared its intent to create the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere including China, the U.S. began sending aid to the nationalist Chinese government and President Roosevelt directed the War Department to formalize contingency plans for a land war in Asia. While not as well developed as War Plan Orange by the outbreak of war with Japan in 1941, War Plan Amber was shown to the British Government's personal liaison with President Roosevelt Captain A.W. Clarke (Royal Navy) alongside Orange in October 1940.[6]
War Plan Amber as a contingency was a back up for War Plan Orange provided a number of conditions:
- A significant portion of the U.S. Pacific Fleet has been attrited by Japanese forces
- The British Empire has declared war on Japan
- The Suez Canal is open to American shipping
- China had not completely fallen to Japan and was accessible from the British Raj
- The United States was not involved in a war in Europe
Due to the complexity and potentially astronomical risk involved, if any of those five conditions were not met the U.S. would continue with War Plan Orange, even if it meant delaying the war. However, a faction of War Plan Orange detractors—spiritually led by Admiral James Richardson—and the U.S. Army who feared irrelevence under the maritime-dominant Orange kept War Plan Amber alive as a realistic contingency.
With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, following the devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged—and British pressure thereafter to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles.
Notes
- ↑ Pardoe, B.L. (2014). Never Wars: The US War Plans to Invade the World. Fonthill Media. Kindle Edition. p. 174
- ↑ Pardoe, B.L. (2014), p. 166
- ↑ Pardoe, B.L. (2014), p. 167
- ↑ Pardoe, B.L. (2014), p. 168-172
- ↑ Doyle, M.K. (1980). "The U.S. Navy and War Plan Orange, 1933-1940: Making Necessity a Virtue". Naval War College Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (May-June 1980), p. . JSTOR.
- ↑ Doyle (1980). p. 49.