User:Admin/Sandbox2 - Revision history

Admin at 04:06, 26 December 2024

2024-12-26T04:06:24Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:06, 25 December 2024
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	'''War Plan Amber''' was one of the {{wpl\|United States color-coded war plans\|color-coded war plans}} drafted during by the United States. It dealt with a potential war with Japan as a back-up to War Plan Orange, formented by the early events of the Second Sino-Japanese War and a formalization of Anglo-American alignment in the region. Its core tenet was a land war against Japan in Southern China via the British Raj and Burma, with U.S. naval forces in the East Pacific (i.e. Hawaii and the United States) on the strategic defensive until naval production could be ramped up.		{{Infobox military conflict
			\| conflict = War Plan Amber
			\| width =
			\| partof =
			\| image = War_Plan_Amber-01.png
			\| image_size = 320px
			\| caption = War Plan Amber was a strategic plan for war against Japan assuming a land war strategy. Under the plan "Blue" indicated the United States and its territories, "Red" the British Empire, "Yellow" the Republic of China, and "Orange" Japan and its puppets.<br><span style="color:gray;"><small>Note borders are rough and may not reflect accurately to the time period</small></span>
			\| date = 1920s to 1930s
			\| place = Asia-Pacific Region
			\| status =
			*Published as a War Department Operations Plan in 1940
			*Executed in effect during the Pacific War from 1942
			\| combatant1 = {{flagicon\|United States}} United States<br>{{flagicon\|United Kingdom}} British Empire
			* {{flagicon\|United Kingdom}} United Kingdom
			* {{flagicon\|British Raj}} British Raj
			* Canada
			* Newfoundland
			* {{flagicon\|Australia}} Australia
			* New Zealand
			{{flagicon\|ROC}} Republic of China<br>{{flagicon\|Philippines\|1936}} Commonwealth of the Philippines

			\| combatant2 = {{flagicon\|Japan}} Japan
			\| commander1 =
			\| commander2 =
			\| units1 =
			\| units2 =
			\| strength1 =
			\| strength2 =
			\| casualties1 =
			\| casualties2 =
			}}'''War Plan Amber''' was one of the {{wpl\|United States color-coded war plans\|color-coded war plans}} drafted during by the United States. It dealt with a potential war with Japan as a back-up to War Plan Orange, formented by the early events of the Second Sino-Japanese War and a formalization of Anglo-American alignment in the region. Its core tenet was a land war against Japan in Southern China via the British Raj and Burma, with U.S. naval forces in the East Pacific (i.e. Hawaii and the United States) on the strategic defensive until naval production could be ramped up.

	The plan assumed early defeats at the hands of the IJN had attrited the U.S. Navy to the point that it could not conduct offensive naval operations in the Central or South Pacific Areas until disparities in naval superiority had been rectified. It also assumed that the British would be an ally of the United States in a war against Japan, and that the Royal Navy would take the lead in securing the Indian Ocean and enabling offensive operations into the Southwest Pacific Area.		The plan assumed early defeats at the hands of the IJN had attrited the U.S. Navy to the point that it could not conduct offensive naval operations in the Central or South Pacific Areas until disparities in naval superiority had been rectified. It also assumed that the British would be an ally of the United States in a war against Japan, and that the Royal Navy would take the lead in securing the Indian Ocean and enabling offensive operations into the Southwest Pacific Area.

Admin at 03:41, 26 December 2024

2024-12-26T03:41:19Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:41, 25 December 2024
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			'''War Plan Amber''' was one of the {{wpl\|United States color-coded war plans\|color-coded war plans}} drafted during by the United States. It dealt with a potential war with Japan as a back-up to War Plan Orange, formented by the early events of the Second Sino-Japanese War and a formalization of Anglo-American alignment in the region. Its core tenet was a land war against Japan in Southern China via the British Raj and Burma, with U.S. naval forces in the East Pacific (i.e. Hawaii and the United States) on the strategic defensive until naval production could be ramped up.

			The plan assumed early defeats at the hands of the IJN had attrited the U.S. Navy to the point that it could not conduct offensive naval operations in the Central or South Pacific Areas until disparities in naval superiority had been rectified. It also assumed that the British would be an ally of the United States in a war against Japan, and that the Royal Navy would take the lead in securing the Indian Ocean and enabling offensive operations into the Southwest Pacific Area.

	~~'''~~War Plan Amber~~''' was one~~ of the ~~{{wpl\|United States color~~-~~coded war plans\|color~~-~~coded war plans}} drafted during by the United States~~.		Due to the loss of three American fleet carriers sunk and one severely damaged at the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway against the Japanese, the U.S. in-practice reverted to War Plan Amber and began military operations in Burma to link up with the Republic of China. It did not resume offensive naval operations in the Central Pacific until mid- to late-1943.

	==Development of War Plan Amber==		==Development of War Plan Amber==
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	==Pacific War implementation==		==Pacific War implementation==
	With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's ~~tenents~~. However, what followed were devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged. The British thereafter pressured the U.S. to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, and the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin. By 1946, Allied forces had managed to advance to Shanghai and Nanjing, while Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and Beijing on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Two weeks after American troops reached the Yangtze River, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima by a B-29 bomber launched from Taizhou, Zhejiang province. This was followed one week later by the atomic bombing of Kokura, ending the Pacific War on 10 July 1946.		With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenets. However, what followed were devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost three fleet carriers sunk and one severely damaged. The British thereafter pressured the U.S. to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, and the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin. By 1946, Allied forces had managed to advance to Shanghai and Nanjing, while Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and Beijing on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Two weeks after American troops reached the Yangtze River, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima by a B-29 bomber launched from Taizhou, Zhejiang province. This was followed one week later by the atomic bombing of Kokura, ending the Pacific War on 10 July 1946.

	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references />		<references />

Admin: /* Pacific War implementation */

2024-12-26T03:32:03Z

Pacific War implementation

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:32, 25 December 2024
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	==Pacific War implementation==		==Pacific War implementation==
	With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, what followed were devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged. The British thereafter pressured the U.S. to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, and the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin. By 1946, Allied forces had managed to advance to Shanghai and Nanjing, while Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and Beijing on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Two weeks after American troops reached the Yangtze River, the first atomic ~~bombed~~ was dropped on Hiroshima, followed by Kokura, ending the Pacific War on 10 July 1946.		With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, what followed were devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged. The British thereafter pressured the U.S. to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, and the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin. By 1946, Allied forces had managed to advance to Shanghai and Nanjing, while Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and Beijing on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Two weeks after American troops reached the Yangtze River, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima by a B-29 bomber launched from Taizhou, Zhejiang province. This was followed one week later by the atomic bombing of Kokura, ending the Pacific War on 10 July 1946.

	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references />		<references />

Admin: /* Pacific War implementation */

2024-12-26T03:27:59Z

Pacific War implementation

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:27, 25 December 2024
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	==Pacific War implementation==		==Pacific War implementation==
	With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, what followed were devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged. The British thereafter pressured the U.S. to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, and the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin. By 1946, Allied forces had managed to advance to Shanghai and Nanjing, while Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and Beijing on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic.		With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, what followed were devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged. The British thereafter pressured the U.S. to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, and the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin. By 1946, Allied forces had managed to advance to Shanghai and Nanjing, while Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and Beijing on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Two weeks after American troops reached the Yangtze River, the first atomic bombed was dropped on Hiroshima, followed by Kokura, ending the Pacific War on 10 July 1946.

	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references />		<references />

Admin: /* Synthesis with War Plan Orange */

2024-12-26T03:25:03Z

Synthesis with War Plan Orange

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:25, 25 December 2024
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	Case Amber in essence called for a large ground force to be sent to the British Raj via the Suez Canal and move into southern China via Burma to attack Japanese ground forces. If critical naval lines of communication remained secured or could be recaptured, such as those at Singapore and the Dutch Indies, the combined allied force would initiate amphibious assaults into Japanese-held Southern China, Indochina, and the Philippines to introduce strategic dillemmas for Japanese forces and take back the lost European territories. U.S. Naval Forces in the East Pacific would operate on the strategic defensive until such a time as naval superiority could be achieved. The initial principle task of British Commonwealth forces would be to hold Singapore, Burma and India in order to facilitate the movement and build up for forces.		Case Amber in essence called for a large ground force to be sent to the British Raj via the Suez Canal and move into southern China via Burma to attack Japanese ground forces. If critical naval lines of communication remained secured or could be recaptured, such as those at Singapore and the Dutch Indies, the combined allied force would initiate amphibious assaults into Japanese-held Southern China, Indochina, and the Philippines to introduce strategic dillemmas for Japanese forces and take back the lost European territories. U.S. Naval Forces in the East Pacific would operate on the strategic defensive until such a time as naval superiority could be achieved. The initial principle task of British Commonwealth forces would be to hold Singapore, Burma and India in order to facilitate the movement and build up for forces.

	With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, ~~following the~~ devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely ~~damaged—and~~ British ~~pressure~~ thereafter to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin.		==Pacific War implementation==
			With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, what followed were devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged. The British thereafter pressured the U.S. to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, and the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin. By 1946, Allied forces had managed to advance to Shanghai and Nanjing, while Soviet forces had invaded Manchuria and Beijing on behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references />		<references />

Admin: /* War Plan Orange */

2024-12-26T03:19:17Z

War Plan Orange

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:19, 25 December 2024
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	* American interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean were secure, implicitly suggesting alignment of the United Kingdom with the United States during the conflict		* American interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean were secure, implicitly suggesting alignment of the United Kingdom with the United States during the conflict

	War Plan Orange was a largely naval strategy, offensively striking out west of Hawaii into what was described by some as a "Japanese lake"<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)], p. 52</ref>, potentially stretching from New Caledonia to Fiji, Midway, and the Aleutian Islands.		War Plan Orange was a largely naval strategy, offensively striking out west of Hawaii into what was described by some as a "Japanese lake"<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)], p. 52</ref>, potentially stretching from New Caledonia to Fiji, Midway, and the Aleutian Islands. American holdings in the Far East, including the Philippines and Guam, would have to hold out while American naval forces mobilized and safeguarded the western coast of the United States before moving to relieve them. After this, the U.S. Navy would seek a decisive engagement with Japanese naval forces, win it, and blockade the Japanese home islands.

	===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===		===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===

Admin: /* Synthesis with War Plan Orange */

2024-12-26T03:17:07Z

Synthesis with War Plan Orange

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:17, 25 December 2024
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	===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===		===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===
	In December 1937, following the Japanese sinking of the USS ''Panay'' on the Yangtze River and the Nanjing massacre, the U.S. War Department began independently drafting War Plan Amber as a contingency for war against Japan in China. After Japan declared its intent to create the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere including China, the U.S. began sending aid to the nationalist Chinese government and President Roosevelt directed the War Department to formalize contingency plans for a land war in Asia. While not as well developed as War Plan Orange by the outbreak of war with Japan in 1941, War Plan Amber was shown to the British Government's personal liaison with President Roosevelt Captain A.W. Clarke (Royal Navy) alongside Orange in October 1940.<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)]. p. 49.</ref>		In December 1937, following the Japanese sinking of the USS ''Panay'' on the Yangtze River and the Nanjing massacre, the U.S. War Department began independently drafting War Plan Amber as a contingency for war against Japan in China. After Japan declared its intent to create the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere including China, the U.S. began sending aid to the nationalist Chinese government and President Roosevelt directed the War Department to formalize contingency plans for a land war in Asia. While not as well developed as War Plan Orange by the outbreak of war with Japan in 1941, War Plan Amber was shown to the British Government's personal liaison with President Roosevelt Captain A.W. Clarke (Royal Navy) alongside Orange in October 1940.<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)]. p. 49.</ref>

	It was assumed if a Pacific naval offensive was not possible, the Philippines would likely not be held—making U.S. Navy plans to relocate the fleet to the Philippines impossible—and supply lines to Australia would be under threat, necessitating transit to India via the Suez.

	War Plan Amber as a contingency was a back up for War Plan Orange provided a number of conditions:		War Plan Amber as a contingency was a back up for War Plan Orange provided a number of conditions:
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	* The United States was not involved in a war in Europe		* The United States was not involved in a war in Europe

	Due to the complexity and potentially astronomical risk involved, if any of those five conditions were not met the U.S. would continue with War Plan Orange, even if it meant delaying the victory against Japan. However, a faction of War Plan Orange detractors—spiritually led by Admiral James Richardson—and the U.S. Army who feared irrelevence under the maritime-dominant Orange kept War Plan Amber alive as a realistic contingency.		It was assumed if a Pacific naval offensive was not possible, the Philippines and potentially even Guam would likely not be held—making U.S. Navy plans to relocate the fleet to the Philippines impossible—and supply lines to Australia would be under threat, necessitating transit to India via the Suez. It was also assumed given the intersection of British and American interests in the Pacific and Anglophobia stemming from interwar rivalries waning that the British were likely to be drawn into any war with Japan that the U.S. had managed to be drawn into. Due to the complexity and potentially astronomical risk involved, if any of those five conditions were not met the U.S. would continue with War Plan Orange, even if it meant delaying the victory against Japan. However, a faction of War Plan Orange detractors—spiritually led by Admiral James Richardson—and the U.S. Army who feared irrelevence under the maritime-dominant Orange kept War Plan Amber alive as a realistic contingency.

			Case Amber in essence called for a large ground force to be sent to the British Raj via the Suez Canal and move into southern China via Burma to attack Japanese ground forces. If critical naval lines of communication remained secured or could be recaptured, such as those at Singapore and the Dutch Indies, the combined allied force would initiate amphibious assaults into Japanese-held Southern China, Indochina, and the Philippines to introduce strategic dillemmas for Japanese forces and take back the lost European territories. U.S. Naval Forces in the East Pacific would operate on the strategic defensive until such a time as naval superiority could be achieved. The initial principle task of British Commonwealth forces would be to hold Singapore, Burma and India in order to facilitate the movement and build up for forces.

	With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, following the devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged—and British pressure thereafter to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles.		With the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, it was assumed that the military response would roughly follow War Plan Orange's tenents. However, following the devastating losses of the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway—where the U.S. Navy lost 2 fleet carriers sunk and 1 severely damaged—and British pressure thereafter to follow their lead in attacking up from the British Raj into China in order to get within bomber range of Japan, the U.S. shifted to War Plan Amber's guiding principles. It wouldn't be until mid- to late-1943 that American naval production had ramped up to the point where naval losses endured in 1941 and 1942 had been completely nullified and the Navy's "island hopping" campaign through the Central Pacific Area and operations in the South Pacific to protect Australia could begin.

	==Notes==		==Notes==
	<references />		<references />

Admin: /* Synthesis with War Plan Orange */

2024-12-26T02:39:44Z

Synthesis with War Plan Orange

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:39, 25 December 2024
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	In December 1937, following the Japanese sinking of the USS ''Panay'' on the Yangtze River and the Nanjing massacre, the U.S. War Department began independently drafting War Plan Amber as a contingency for war against Japan in China. After Japan declared its intent to create the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere including China, the U.S. began sending aid to the nationalist Chinese government and President Roosevelt directed the War Department to formalize contingency plans for a land war in Asia. While not as well developed as War Plan Orange by the outbreak of war with Japan in 1941, War Plan Amber was shown to the British Government's personal liaison with President Roosevelt Captain A.W. Clarke (Royal Navy) alongside Orange in October 1940.<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)]. p. 49.</ref>		In December 1937, following the Japanese sinking of the USS ''Panay'' on the Yangtze River and the Nanjing massacre, the U.S. War Department began independently drafting War Plan Amber as a contingency for war against Japan in China. After Japan declared its intent to create the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere including China, the U.S. began sending aid to the nationalist Chinese government and President Roosevelt directed the War Department to formalize contingency plans for a land war in Asia. While not as well developed as War Plan Orange by the outbreak of war with Japan in 1941, War Plan Amber was shown to the British Government's personal liaison with President Roosevelt Captain A.W. Clarke (Royal Navy) alongside Orange in October 1940.<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)]. p. 49.</ref>

	It was assumed if a Pacific naval offensive was not possible, the Philippines would likely not be ~~held and~~ supply lines to Australia would be under threat, necessitating transit to India via the Suez.		It was assumed if a Pacific naval offensive was not possible, the Philippines would likely not be held—making U.S. Navy plans to relocate the fleet to the Philippines impossible—and supply lines to Australia would be under threat, necessitating transit to India via the Suez.

	War Plan Amber as a contingency was a back up for War Plan Orange provided a number of conditions:		War Plan Amber as a contingency was a back up for War Plan Orange provided a number of conditions:

Admin: /* War Plan Orange */

2024-12-26T02:39:08Z

War Plan Orange

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:39, 25 December 2024
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	* American interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean were secure, implicitly suggesting alignment of the United Kingdom with the United States during the conflict		* American interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean were secure, implicitly suggesting alignment of the United Kingdom with the United States during the conflict

	War Plan Orange was a largely naval strategy, offensively striking out west of Hawaii into what was described by some as a "Japanese lake"<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)], p. 52] potentially stretching from New Caledonia to Fiji, Midway, and the Aleutian Islands.		War Plan Orange was a largely naval strategy, offensively striking out west of Hawaii into what was described by some as a "Japanese lake"<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)], p. 52</ref>, potentially stretching from New Caledonia to Fiji, Midway, and the Aleutian Islands.

	===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===		===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===

Admin: /* War Plan Orange */

2024-12-26T02:38:34Z

War Plan Orange

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:38, 25 December 2024
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	===War Plan Orange===		===War Plan Orange===
	The U.S. War Department's War Plan Orange dealt with war against Japan, motivated by Japan's expansionist policy in Asia and the threat it would inevitably pose to American interests in the Far East. War Plan Orange assumed the following conditions in such a war:<ref>Doyle, M.K. (1980). "The U.S. Navy and War Plan Orange, 1933-1940: Making Necessity a Virtue". Naval War College Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (May-June 1980), p. 4. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 JSTOR.]</ref>		The U.S. War Department's War Plan Orange dealt with war against Japan, motivated by Japan's expansionist policy in Asia and the threat it would inevitably pose to American interests in the Far East. War Plan Orange assumed the following conditions in such a war:<ref>Doyle, M.K. (1980). "The U.S. Navy and War Plan Orange, 1933-1940: Making Necessity a Virtue". Naval War College Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (May-June 1980), p. 451. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 JSTOR.]</ref>
	* The United States would fight Japan alone		* The United States would fight Japan alone
	* There was no ongoing war in Europe		* There was no ongoing war in Europe
	* American interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean were secure, implicitly suggesting alignment of the United Kingdom with the United States during the conflict		* American interests in the Atlantic and Caribbean were secure, implicitly suggesting alignment of the United Kingdom with the United States during the conflict

			War Plan Orange was a largely naval strategy, offensively striking out west of Hawaii into what was described by some as a "Japanese lake"<ref>[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44642633?oauth_data=eyJlbWFpbCI6ImVkaXRvckBiYXR0bGVvcmRlci5vcmciLCJpbnN0aXR1dGlvbklkcyI6W10sInByb3ZpZGVyIjoiZ29vZ2xlIn0 Doyle (1980)], p. 52] potentially stretching from New Caledonia to Fiji, Midway, and the Aleutian Islands.

	===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===		===Synthesis with War Plan Orange===